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A government applying for a club membership may strategically delay entry to cope 
with the hold-up problem introduced by anticipatory investments of the private 
sector. In equilibrium of a two-period incomplete information game, we find that a 
pro-entry government may strategically delay to imitate an anti-entry government 
and thereby affect expectations of the private sector. The delay is more likely if the 
government has a good electoral prospect, is internationally weak, and is not 
considered to be too keen on entry. The model is related to the case of the Czech 
Republic where the government recently softened commitment in the euro 
adoption strategy.  
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 1. Introduction
The EMU enlargement literature discusses predominantly the existence of the
conditions for an optimal currency area, alternatively understood as an optimal
club size in the club goods literature (Dean, 2004). The key topics are price and
output level convergence (Frenkel and Nickel, 2005), business cycle correlation
(Horvath and Ratfaia, 2004; for a meta-analysis, see Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006),
and (ir)relevance of Maastricht criteria (e.g., Hallett and Lewisc, 2007).
Purely positive approaches complement the normative picture by attempts
to identify strategic microfoundations of entry (Willett, 2000). Two groups of
explanations stand out. The political economy of exchange rate combines interest-
group politics and the macroeconomics to explain the choice of an exchange rate
regime (see Broz and Frieden, 2001; Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein, 2001; Frieden 2002).
GrÄ uner and Hefeker (1996) in particular investigate into lobbying of large European
banks. As an alternative, two-level game approach links club conditionality to
a con°ict in domestic politics. EMU conditionality is thus used to curb public
spending and/or reduce taxes; extra constraints on the international level bring
domestic policy bene¯ts to the conservative incumbent (Dyson, 2006; Donnelly,
2005).
This paper focuses on yet another strategic determinant of entry, related to
bargaining on entry conditions. Intergovernmental bargaining about the Eurozone
is neglected in the literature since the future EMU member states have already
accepted immutable entry conditions formed on the basis of preceding intergovern-
mental bargaining (Eichengreen and Frieden, 2000). Nevertheless, linkages across
policy dimensions (i.e., credibility devices extended from one dimension to an-
other, enhanced by international institutions) allow for in°ows and out°ows of
compensating transfers even if conditionality is ¯xed. Treaty negotiations, transfer
payments, and CAP reform are the prominent examples. A particularly e®ective
issue linkage is achieved by strategic delegation of a high-level representative (see
Harstad 2007, 2008).1
In theory, a weaker commitment to euro entry might help to extract additional
side payments in several ways. Fahrholz (2007) argues that compensations by
means of structural funds can be raised by crisis behavior in the ERM II. The
problem of this argument is assumption on the distribution of costs related to the
crisis behavior, favoring the culprit. Also, the considered multilateral character of
the ERM II, referring mainly to the possible participation of the ECB in interven-
tions at the §15% margin, is in practice very much limited by the very short term
¯nancing (VSTF) facility (Antal, Holub, 2007). Most importantly, any model of
intentional crisis behavior seems to underestimate the magnitude of risks of the
intentional crisis behavior (cf., LeBlang, 2003; Eichengreen and Rose, 2003).
1For further details on the institutional linkages in the context of the EU-level bargaining, see
Slapin (2008).
1This paper claims that some bene¯ts may seized rather by addressing a hold-
up problem with domestic ¯rms whose sunk costs undermine negotiation position
of the domestic government. The costs relate mainly to exporters, large manufac-
turers, ¯nancial companies, and investors into the commercial properties, but a
related e®ect might be seen also in uno±cial use of the euro as a parallel currency.
We follow a model of the EU enlargement in Wallner (2003) where anticipation
of enlargement leads ¯rms to make relational investments that undermine negoti-
ation power of the accessing government. The resulting drop in the threatpoint
allows the club to charge a higher entrance fee. If the club can give take-or-leave
o®er, the applicant even inevitably su®ers from immiserization: it would be better
o® to be prevented from joining the club for good.
Unlike Wallner (2003), we show that the applicant government may e®ectively
address the hold-up problem if it disposes with an option of costly delay. Further-
more, we demonstrate that a necessary condition for strategic delay to in°uence
the investors with rational expectations is incomplete information about the mul-
tiple types of government, di®ering in club membership valuation. The case of
entry into monetary union is modeled in a simple representative-¯rm economy,
stressing thus intergovernmental bargaining over the interest-group con°ict about
the exchange rate. The main policy conjecture is that a strategy of a surprise entry
involving a probability of delay delivers extra bene¯ts compared to the strategy of
a strict commitment to entry.
The model might be applied to the case of the Czech Republic where a right-
center government in year 2007 canceled the pre-announced euro-adoption schedule
and started to condition the EMU entry upon reform support of the opposition
parties. The theoretical model actually predicts a mixed strategy of the pro-
entry government, and in equilibrium, uncertainty over timing of entry in the
presence of multiple types of government. We identify both as follows: (i) A
strong laggard position of the President, and the President's appointees in the
Bank Board of the National Central Bank, demonstrate the existence of other than
a pro-entry type. (ii) Mixed strategy is observed in a sense that the government
is not explicit about the link to the strong laggards, and mixes pro-entry and
pro-delay messages. (iii) Public opinion is relatively polarized, as compared to to
NMS-9, hence median voter is a fragile predictive heuristics and the distribution
of outcomes in probabilistic voting models is rather °at. This implies that the
government's strategy is not bound by pre-electoral expectations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 de¯nes the setup and proves the
existence of a hold-up problem for su±ciently high anticipations. Section 3 brie°y
discusses a benchmark single period case. Here, the government can avoid the
hold-up problem only by means of a time-inconsistent policy. To provide realistic
strategic instruments for the government, Section 4 extends the setup into a two-
period two-type case with time-consistent policies only. Uniqueness of the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with strategic delay, as well as corresponding comparative
2statics, are derived. Next, Section 5 applies the mechanism to the case of the
Czech Republic in 2007{2008. Section 6 concludes.
2. The setup
Consider three players: a club of countries (C), a government of an applicant
country (G), and a representative ¯rm in the country (F). The government decides
whether to irreversibly apply for entry or not, e 2 [0;1]. Suppose that the only
economic e®ect of the entry is a real productivity shock in the country, without any
e®ect on the productivity in the club. This assumption is only to avoid unnecessary
notation when expressing the bargaining prize; an extra cost/bene¯t on part of
the club would only a®ect participation constraint of the club. Assume that entry
as such implies a prize v for the government, to be interpreted as a continuation
value of ongoing political integration (i.e. positive for federalists and negative for
autonomists).
The ¯rm employs homogenous capital at amount k ¸ 0. That is, the hold-
up problem is not due to the relational investments like in Wallner (2003). The
country is a small open economy facing a constant interest rate r > 0. The output
is given by AK-production function, increasing and concave in capital k,
y = af(k);fk > 0;fkk < 0: (1)
Productivity is low in the case of no entry, a > 0, and high in the case of entry,
¹ a > a. The ¯rms' pro¯ts are taxed by a corporate tax at a °at rate ¿ 2 [0;1].
Hence, expecting the entry with probability » 2 [0;1], the ¯rm invests
K(») := argmax
k
f(1 ¡ ¿)[»¹ a + (1 ¡ »)a]f(k) ¡ rkg: (2)
The implicit-form solution to Eq. (2) writes (1¡¿)[»¹ a+(1¡»)a]fk(K(»)) = r.
From the implicit function theorem, observe that the investments grow if the entry
is more likely:2
K» = ¡
[»¹ a + (1 ¡ »)a]fkk
fk(¹ a ¡ a)
> 0 (3)
It is convenient at this point to introduce k := K(0) and ¹ k := K(1). For
any k 2 [k;¹ k], total bene¯ts of the entry for the ¯rm, (1 ¡ ¿)(¹ a ¡ a)f(k), can be
divided into two parts. First, the ¯rm cashes in extra pro¯ts of the producer's
surplus above the interest rate, s(k) := (1¡¿)¹ af(k)¡rk. Second, the ¯rm avoids
a loss implied by overinvesting in the case of no-entry, l(k) := rk ¡ (1 ¡ ¿)af(k).
For k 2 [k;¹ k], the surplus is non-decreasing and concave, sk = (1¡¿)¹ afk ¡r ¸
0;skk = (1 ¡ ¿)¹ afkk < 0, and the loss is non-decreasing and convex, lk = r ¡ (1 ¡
¿)afk ¸ 0;lkk = (1 ¡ ¿)afkk > 0. Notice that under the most pessimistic outlook
2Henceforth, partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts.
3of the ¯rm (» = 0), there is no overinvestment, hence loss is zero, l(k) = 0, but
surplus is still positive, s(k) > 0.
From the aggregate perspective, entry brings extra gross product s(k)=(1¡¿),
and avoids losing gross product of overinvestment l(k)=(1¡¿). Thus, the extra tax









Upon entry, bene¯ts of the membership (extra tax revenues from productivity
increase in the applicant country, plus the continuation value of the membership)
are subject to bargaining between the club and the applicant government. Suppose
that the club and the government make alternating o®ers, with the club being a
¯rst mover. There is a constant risk of breakdown in each round, q 2 (0;1). Let
® 2 [0;1] be the share of prize of the government, and 1 ¡ ® the share of the
prize of the club. Following Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), the shares in the
subgame-perfect equilibrium risk-neutral players satisfy ® = (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®), i.e.
® = (1 ¡ q)=(2 ¡ q) 2 (0;1=2). An alternative way to capture power asymmetry
between the government and the club would be to link country-size (respectively
club size) to risk-aversion, and assume that the bargaining set is composed of
lotteries over two pure agreements, either all for the club, or all for the government.
Total bargaining prize is S(k)+L(k)+v, and disagreement payo®s are zero for
the club and ¡L(k) for the government. Bargaining takes place only if the value
of the membership is not too negative, v ¸ ¡S(k) ¡ L(k). The subgame-perfect
equilibrium writes
¼G = ®(S(k) + v) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)L(k) R 0; (5)
¼C = (1 ¡ ®)(S(k) + L(k) + v) ¸ 0: (6)
Notice that immiserization happens if ¼G < 0, which holds whenever the elative
power of the club, 1 ¡ ®, is su±ciently large. Proposition 1 uses equilibrium
in the bargaining subgame to establish the existence of the hold-up problem for
su±ciently high levels of capital. Speci¯cally, the proposition shows that above
a critical level, the payo® of the government decreases in the expectations of the
¯rm.
Proposition 1 Upon entry, the maximal payo® for the government, maxk ¼G, is
attained for k¤ := K(®) < ¹ k.
Here, too optimistic pro-entry expectations of the ¯rm harm the government
because the ¯rm with large investments doesn't internalize the e®ect of invest-
ments on the threatpoint of the government. A con°ict of interests between the
government and the ¯rm arises exactly on the interval of expectations [®;1], or
correspondingly, on an interval of investments [k¤;¹ k]. The ¯rm would like to seize
4maximal bene¯ts, for which the expected rate of entry must be one, while the gov-
ernment wants to temper the anticipations of the ¯rm towards » = ® and thereby
minimize or eliminate the hold-up problem.
3. Single period, single type
The equilibrium in the benchmark single-period game depends chie°y on commit-
ment power of the players. Suppose that the government does not dispose with
commitment, hence can play only a time-consistent policy (i.e., we assume either
a simultaneous game, or a sequential game with ¯rm as a Stackelberg leader). The
government has two actions, no entry with payo® ¡L(k), and entry with payo®
®(S(k) + L(k) + v) ¡ L(k). As long as the bargaining prize is positive, subgame-
perfection implies entry with probability one, e = 1. By rational expectations,
» = 1, and k = ¹ k. As a consequence, the government su®ers from the extreme
version of the hold-up problem.
The other case is that the government can credibly pre-commit to any, even
time-inconsistent policy. From Proposition 1, the government clearly imposes e =
® to induce a subgame where the ¯rm subsequently sets k = K(®) = k¤.
To use the latter case as an exclusive explanation of partial unwillingness of a
pro-entry government to enter the club may be premature because of two aspects:
(i) Policy commitments, unlike long-term investment decisions, are typically dif-
¯cult to preserve over a long period of time. Given proliferation of evidence on
dynamic inconsistency, an explanation based on time-inconsistent policies is not
much appealing. (ii) The model implies a positive (albeit small) probability that
a government with a su±ciently high continuation value never enters the club. A
threat leading into such a striking outcome is very unlikely. The shortcomings
inevitably result from simplicity of the single-period setting, wherein the con°ict
of interests between the ¯rm and the government is solved to the advantage of
either of players, and the result must be at an extremum.
The next section addresses both quali¯cations: The government does not have
Stackelberg leadership, and unless it has a prohibitively low continuation value of
membership, it eventually enters the club with certainty. The model thus captures
a case of strategic laggards.
Importantly, the section will introduce two key ideas: (i) Further integration
may be conditional on the monetary union, and (ii) governments or politicians dif-
fer in the valuation of the ongoing integration, and on the expectation that the in-
tegration is conditional on the union. The former is justi¯ed by the frequent claims
that deepening of the European Union (e.g., centralization in social policy, ¯scal
policy, labor market regulations, and even tax harmonization) rests on success of
the existing integrations, especially the monetary union (Dyson, 2006). Interde-
pendence of policies (a.k.a. nested games, or policy spillovers) then largely a®ects
attractiveness of irreversible decisions, of which the euro adoption is a primary
5example. Secondly, heterogeneous valuation re°ects a heterogeneous interests or
beliefs. Their existence is apparent even within the group of old member states,
where `membership with derogation' of the UK, Sweden, and particularly Den-
mark (with hard peg to euro) is di±cult to determine purely on macroeconomic
grounds.
4. Two periods, two types
The economy lasts two periods, t = 1;2, and a common discount factor is ± 2
(0;1). The government is either of two types, neutral or autonomist. The types
di®er only in continuation values of membership, where the neutral government is
characterized by ¹ v = 0, and the value of the autonomist type is set prohibitively
low, v < ¡S(1)¡L(1). Type is private information, and the ¯rm's belief that the
government is neutral in period t is pt := Prob(v = 0jt) 2 [0;1].
The game starts by a random draw of Nature that assigns the government type
to be neutral with probability p1 2 [0;1]. In each of the two periods, timing is as
follows: (i) The ¯rm sets kt ¸ 0, and the government decides on entry, where we
have to distinguish between strategies of di®erent types: ¹ et;et 2 [0;1]. (ii) In the
case of entry, bargaining takes place. As we will see below, by deciding to bargain,
the government truthfully reveals its type, so we can maintain a bargaining solution
that represents a non-cooperative bargaining with complete information of the club
and the government, instead of war-of-attrition or similar incomplete-information
bargaining models.
Entry is irreversible. In contrast, decision not to enter in period 1 may be
reversed into entry in period 2, i.e. the government may behave as a strategic
laggard. (iii) At last, Production takes place, pro¯ts are taxed and in the case of
entry, bargaining prize is redistributed.
Exogeneity of the corporate tax rate ¿ 2 (0;1) deserves a note: In the case of
an endogenous tax rate, not only entry policy but also tax rate would signal type.
At this point, we are not interested in the interplay of these two tools, albeit it
constitutes an interesting theoretical possibility. The main reason to sidestep this
e®ect is that an exogenous linear tax system perfectly aligns the pre-bargaining
interests of the government and the ¯rm.
4.1 The last period
In period 2, the case of country already in the club is equivalent to constraining
action of the government to e2 = 1, hence by rational expectations » = 1 and
k2 = ¹ k. If not in the club, the strategies di®er by type. The autonomist government
does not enter, e2 = 0, because bargaining prize is negative for any k2 2 [k;¹ k],
S(k2) + L(k2) + v < 0. In contrast, the neutral government enters with certainty,
¹ e2 = 1, because no-entry brings only disagreement payo® ¡L(k2), whereas entry
implies a bargaining share of S(k2)+L(k2) above this payo®. Lemma 1 moreover
6proves that the autonomist government does not enter in period 1 either, and as a
corollary, that by deciding to enter the neutral government reveals its type. Proof
of the lemma as well as all subsequent proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 1 The autonomist government never enters, e1 = e2 = 0.
With Lemma 1, we can focus only on the neutral type, and accordingly simplify
notation, et := ¹ et. A corollary of the Lemma 1 is that the ¯rm in any period





Hence, the less likely the delay emerges, the stronger is the signal and the
lower are the investments. Only if the strategic delay is used infrequently, the ¯rm
observing delay attributes it mainly to the autonomist government, and therefore
turns pessimistic in investment prospects, i.e. p2 falls. Speci¯cally, @p2=@e1 < 0,
where for e1 = 0, p2 = p1 and for e1 = 1, p2 = 0.
4.2 The initial period
To start with, consider the best response of the ¯rm to e1. The strategic power of
investing k1 is limited only to period 1. This is because when the strategy of the
¯rm is set, also the posteriori belief p2 is given (see Eq. (7)). As a result, the ¯rm
behaves as in a single period setting,
k1 = K(»1) = K(e1p1) · K(p1): (8)
To analyze optimization of the neutral government in period 1, we have to ¯rst
derive payo®s under either of actions, entry (E) and no entry (N):
¼G
E(e1;k1) = ®S(k1) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)L(k1) + ±
£




N(e1;k1) = ¡L(k1) + ± [®S ± K(p2) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)L ± K(p2)] (10)
First of all, notice that ¼G
E(¢) is constant in e1. Unlike that, ¼G
N depends on e1,
because the rate of entry in period 1 a®ects a posterior in period 2, hence results
in a di®erent subgame in period 2. We know from Bayes rule that the larger is
entry rate e1, the stronger is a signal of no-entry, hence the expectations »2 = p2
fall, and the amount of capital k2 also falls. Such a fall in capital increases payo® if
p2 = »2 ¸ ®, because for these values of the posterior belief, the hold-up problem
is being remedied (see Proposition 1). For p2 < ®, ¼G
N in contrast falls in e1,
because k2 < k¤, and the decrease in capital is both detrimental to the ¯rm and
the neutral government.




Njk1 = constg: (11)
7To maximize this payo®, the hold-up problem in period 2 must be entirely
eliminated, i.e. »2 = ®:
»2 = p2 =
p1 ¡ E¤(p1)p1
1 ¡ E¤(p1)p1






Interestingly, the payo® from no-entry is independent on k1. It has an inverse
u-shape if E¤(p1) > 0, which (by rearranging) is equivalent to a prior belief p1
being su±ciently large, p1 > ®. In other words, this is whenever hold-up problem
in period 1 exists. Otherwise, E¤(p1) · 0 and on domain e1 2 [0;1], the payo®
is declining in e1. In such a case, p1 < ®, so the hold-up problem in period 1
does not exist. Still, in the latter case, we may observe strategic delay because the
government has to take into account the possible hold-up in the next period 2.










Lemma 2 derives a necessary condition for the best response to include delay.
Then, Lemma 3 proves that the best response, E(k1), is non-decreasing in k1.




p1 ¸ ® : E(k1) < 1 =) ¼G
N(E¤(p1);k1) ¸ ¼G
E(E¤(p1);k1) (14)
p1 < ® : E(k1) < 1 =) ¼G
N(0;k1) ¸ ¼G
E(0;k1) (15)
At this point, it is useful to see that for rationalizable amounts of investments,
a larger amount of capital makes entry relatively more valuable:





= ®[Sk(k1) + Lk(k1)] > 0 (16)
Using this monotonicity, we introduce a critical amount of investment, ~ k, for
which the government is indi®erent between full entry and delay, but only for an
exactly single value of delay e1 < 1.
8e1 2 [0;1] : ¼G
E(e1;~ k) ¸ ¼G
N(e1;~ k) ^ 9e1 2 [0;1) : ¼G
E(e1;~ k) = ¼G
N(e1;~ k) (17)
We may distinguish between two values of the single level of entry, depending
on the presence of the hold up problem in the initial period.
p1 ¸ ® : ¼G
E(E¤(p1);~ k) = ¼G
N(E¤(p1);~ k) (18)
p1 < ® : ¼G
E(0;~ k) = ¼G
N(0;~ k) (19)
Lemma 3 (Best response of the government) For k < ~ k, the best response
is increasing in k1, Ek1 > 0. For k 2 (~ k;~ k + ²), Ek1 = 0. The best response is
step-wise increasing at k = ~ k,
lim
k1!~ k¡
E(k1) = maxf0;E¤(p1)g < 1 = lim
k1!~ k+
E(k1): (20)
84.3 The Bayesian equilibrium
Now, we proceed to the core result. Proposition 2 identi¯es the necessary condition
for the strategic delay to exist and be unique. It is demonstrated on Figure 1 and
used below for the comparative statics analysis.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness) The necessary condition for the existence of a
unique equilibrium with strategic delay, e1 < 1, is






[L(¹ k) ¡ L(k¤)
| {z }
+
]g ¸ S ± K(p1) + L ± K(p1): (21)
Figure 1: Necessary condition for a unique equilibrium with strategic delay
Eq. (21) provides comparative statics on the existence of the strategic delay.
The condition is more likely satis¯ed, if
1. the future is relatively important (large discount rate, ±),
2. the ¯rm is initially pessimistic about the entry (low p1), and
3. the government is weak (low relative bargaining power, ®).
The ¯rst two results are straightforward. To determine the e®ect of the relative
power (1 ¡ ®)=® on the left side of Eq. (21), it is su±cient to use that for k = k¤,
®Sk + (1 ¡ ®)Lk = 0, and from the ¯rst-order condition:










= L(¹ k) ¡ L(k¤) > 0 (22)
9Quite importantly, since the range of (1¡®)=® is (1;+1) ½ R+, the condition
is always satis¯ed if the bargaining position of the government vis-a-vis the club
is su±ciently weak, ® ! 0.
As an interesting implication, Proposition 3 claims that the hold-up problem
in period 2 is not fully removed under strategic delay. Intuitively, by increasing
the rate of entry e1, and consequently decreasing k2 to k¤, (i) some of the forgone
pro¯ts in period 1 are restored, plus (ii) the signal in period 2 is stronger (i.e. hold-
up problem in the next period is better addressed). The cost is nevertheless that
(iii) the government faces a less desirable mix of actions, with an increased share
of entry, where entry gives less than no entry (¼G
E < ¼G
N). This tension between
improving payo®s under actions versus having a better mix of actions leads to a
tradeo® with an incompletely removed hold-up.
Proposition 3 (Non-eliminated hold-up) If strategic delay is in the equilib-
rium pro¯le, e1 < 1, then k2 > k¤, and e1 < E¤(p1).
To conclude, the perfect Bayesian optimum is characterized by four interesting
e®ects:
1. Blu±ng in period 1 is incomplete, e1 < E¤(p1). In other words, the ¯rm
is allowed to instal excessive investments in period 2, k2 > k¤, i.e. hold-up
problem is not fully eliminated in the equilibrium.
2. In the last period, the types of the government separate completely: the
autonomist type does not enter, and the neutral type enters with certainty.
3. We may observe strategic delay even if the hold-up problem is absent in
period 1, p1 < ® (i.e., if the prior belief of the ¯rm is too low to generate a
con°ict between the government and the club in period 1).
4. In spite of strategic delay, the amount of capital may grow over time, k2 > k1.
This holds whenever k1 = K(»1) = K(p1e1) < K(p1E¤(p1)) < K(®) <
K(»2) = k2, i.e. if
p1E¤(p1) = p1 ¡
®
1 ¡ ®
(1 ¡ p1) < ® () p1 < ®(2 ¡ ®): (23)
5. The Czech Republic as a euro laggard
The key features of the model are a su±ciently large positive prior belief on the
autonomistic type of government, and a mixed strategy of the incumbent govern-
ment. The case study of the Czech Republic in 2008 in this section con¯rms both
features. We proceed as follows: First, we discuss the existence of multiply types
of valuations of the ongoing integration. Second, by means of content analysis, we
measure the policy positions to show an intentional delay, with mixing of pro-entry
10and pro-delay messages. Third, we illustrate that the policy uncertainty is made
possible by relative polarization of the public opinion on the Eurozone entry. We
do not cover details on the macroeconomic context of the EMU accession for the
Czech Republic; an interested reader is referred to an excellent survey by BÄ onker
(2006) written an from international perspective.
To approach the decision-making purely game-theoretically, note that in de-
termination of the euro strategy, the two key players are the government and the
Bank Board of the Czech National Bank. The Bank Board is composed of seven
Members (including the governor), who are appointed by the President of the
Republic. Currently, six members out of seven are new appointees of the ruling
President, Vaclav Klaus.3
The coalitional center-right government of PM Mirek Topolanek is in power
since January 9, 2007. There is a link between euro laggards in the National Bank
and the government, not only through joint ¯scal and monetary policy coordina-
tion, but also due to the fact that the President is a long-lasting ex-chairman and
currently Honorary Chairman of the main cabinet party, Civic Democratic Party.
To understand multiple types of membership valuation in the Czech political
setting, I have classi¯ed policy positions of the key political players using a content
analysis of messages in the leading business daily, Hospod¶ a· rsk¶ e noviny (a±liated
with the Wall Street Journal and Handelsblatt), in a period from 9 January 2007
to 9 August 2008 (exactly 19 months). Only signed articles, interviews, or direct
quotes quali¯ed for a message.4 I de¯ne a positive message to be any message that
suggests no extra condition beyond Maastricht criteria, or requires only minor
¯scal adjustments. Among positive messages, I also include recommendations to
commit to timing, or maintain commitment of the previous cabinet. Negative
messages explicitly condition the entry upon real convergence, or major reforms
towards public ¯nance sustainability. Any message that suggests to leave euro to
the experts is also quali¯ed as negative.
Table 1 shows the distribution of overall 93 messages across each of the relevant
groups, with the explanation of coding and data. We may summarize as follows:
1. The President is a strong and committed laggard (100 % negative messages).
The President even argues that `European monetary uni¯cation is the Trojan
horse for overall harmonization of economic rules, policies and laws in EU'
(Klaus, 2003). This exactly captures the way we model negative continuation
value of ongoing membership, v < 0.
2. The Bank Board, with all members appointed or re-appointed by the ruling
President, is pre-dominantly composed of laggards (95 % negative messages).
3Three members came in o±ce on 11 February 2005, two on 1 December 2006 and the last
one on 1 August 2008. Only the governor's mandate (as of 13 February 1999) lasts from the
ex-President, Vaclav Havel.
4The database of 93 messages including brief English-language summaries can be provided
upon request.
113. The government is a laggard (70 % negative messages), whereas the opposi-
tion is strongly in favor of euro adoption (0 % negative messages).
4. Commercial unions representing producers and exporters request early en-
trance (10 % negative messages), whereas ¯nancial industry is more hesitant
on unconditional entry (43 % negative messages).
Table 1: Distribution of messages per groups
Group/Message content { { { + ++ Obs.
President, Advisors 4 (80 %) 1 (20 %) - - 5
National Central Bank 10 (45 %) 11 (50 %) 1 (5 %) - 22
Ministers, Senior O±cials 9 (40 %) 7 (30 %) 7 (30 %) - 23
Financial/Bank Analysts 6 (43 %) - 3 (21 %) 5 (36 %) 14
Commercial Unions - 1 (10 %) 4 (49 %) 5 (50 %) 10
Opposition - - 4 (21 %) 15 (79 %) 19
Total 29 20 19 25 93
Notes: ¡¡ Strong conditionality. An explicit precondition to the entry is either real convergence,
or major reforms towards public ¯nance sustainability. ¡ Delay. Entry is not topic of the day.
Only implicit about conditionality. Leave the issue to experts. + Weak pro-entry. Only minor
¯scal adjustments desirable, no explicit link to the long-term sustainability. Commit to timing
or maintain commitment of the previous cabinet. ++ Strong pro-entry. No extra conditions
beyond Maastricht criteria. Entry on 2011{2012.
Data: Signed articles, interviews, or direct quotes in Hospod¶ a· rsk¶ e noviny (www.ihned.cz). Pe-
riod: 9 January 2007 to 9 August 2008. Keywords: euro adoption, Eurozone entry, EMU entry,
euro acceptance. Accessed 10{28 August 2008.
Is there a binding constraint on the government imposed by public opinion?
To address this point, we look into Eurobarometer Flash (2008) survey data on the
assessment of the consequences of the euro for one's own country and for oneself.
Table 2 shows a relatively high share of negative attitudes in the Czech Republic,
especially when it comes to personal cost/bene¯t analysis. Nonetheless, the share
of positive attitudes is also relatively large, in both cases exactly the median value
(although less than mean value). This shows a relatively polarized country, as
compared to NMS-9.
On top of that, a rank of euro optimism has been constructed as a position
among NMS-9 countries where we sort from top for positive attitudes, and from the
bottom for negative attitudes. The rank shows that the Czech public opinion is not
constraining the government to behave as an outstanding laggard (scoring 4th to
8th position). If fact, the country consistently ranks ahead of Latvia and Lithuania,
although Baltic states are considered pace-setters rather than euro laggards. To
show how close to the bottomline is the Czech Republic in absolute terms, minimal
and maximal values that are relevant to assess pessimism about the euro adoption
are listed in the table. By inspection, the Czech Republic is well above bottomline
12in two out of four variables: total positive attitudes (by 14 percentage points), and
total negative attitudes (by 7.9 percentage points), both regarding the country's
bene¯ts.
Table 2: Consequences of the euro for one's own country and for
oneself in NMS-9
Country (%) ++ + all + ¡ ¡¡ all ¡
CZ 6.5 38.4 44.9 33.7 9.8 43.5
min 2.4 20.3 30.9
max 43.7 11.2 51.4
NMS9 13.1 36.8 49.9 27.7 8.5 36.2
Rank of CZ optimism (7.) (5.) (5.) (6.) (7.) (7.)
Oneself (%) ++ + all + ¡ ¡¡ all ¡
CZ 6.8 34.7 41.5 36.2 11.4 47.6
min 3.4 20.3 37.6
max 37.5 12.7 48
NMS9 14.2 33 47.2 28.9 10 38.9
Rank of CZ optimism (5.) (4.) (5.) (8.) (6.) (8.)
Note: ++ very positive; + positive; - negative; { very negative
Source: Flash Eurobarometer Series #237, The Gallup Organization, July
2008, p. 36, 38, 86, 87 (Q13: Do you think the introduction of the euro
would have positive or negative consequences for your country/yourself?,
Q14: And for you personally, do you think that it would be positive or
negative if the euro would be introduced?). Sample size: N = 1000{1020.
Table 3, using a recent large online poll of the daily Hospod¶ a· rsk¶ e noviny, pro-
vides further piecemeal evidence on the tie in terms of accepting euro early or after
some time. The large dispersion (40 % wants euro as soon as possible, while 35
% never) only con¯rms that the executive is not bound by the preelectoral expec-
tations measured by the polls. More technically, in the case of large polarization,
probabilistic voting models yield a relatively °at probability density on a policy
space (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Also, median voter is a fragile predictive
heuristics. This uncertainty opens a window of opportunity for a strategic delay.
Table 3: When do you prefer the Czech Republic to adopt euro?
before 2011 2011{2012 after 2012 never Total
Votes 860 209 316 743 2128
Share 40 % 10 % 15 % 35 % 100 %
Data source: Online poll of the daily Hospod¶ a· rsk¶ e noviny
(http://www.ihned.cz), 28/07/2008{28/08/2008. Accessed 28 August,
2008. Sample size: N = 2128.
13This section is not to argue that an exclusive motivation for delay is strategic,
related to the hold-up problem. The macroeconomic cost-bene¯t analysis is still an
issue, and the country is not fully complying with the Maastricht criteria. In fact,
the negative recommendation on ERM II entry already by the 2006 Convergence
Report had to shift the euro adoption date from the very initial plan of 2009{2010
till 2012. The case study only shows that exactly as the model predicts, in the case
of uncertainty over multiple types and unbinding public opinion, a government that
is known to be Euroskeptic has an incentive to use manoeuvering space against
too eager private sector. As a matter of fact, since November 2007 update of the
Converge Report, the government ceased to be explicit about timing of entry, and
as Table 1 shows, has provided a mix of 70% negative messages and 30% positive
messages. The anecdotic evidence suggests that the government might be aware
of the strategic advantages of the mixed strategy involving delay.
6. Conclusion
This paper argues that delayed entry into a monetary union might be a bargaining
leverage aimed at increasing bene¯ts from entry. A pro-entry government tends to
strategically delay the EMU entry in order to blu® domestic ¯rms and pretend to
be a government that is principally opposed to the ongoing EU integration. This
remedies the hold-up problem, yet also brings an economy-wide cost of the absence
of entry in earlier periods.
The key comparative statics condition states that this e®ect is more likely if
(i) the government puts large emphasis on the future (e.g., facing a good electoral
prospect), (ii) is relatively weak in bargaining (e.g., a small country), and (iii)
is initially expected to be relatively pessimistic about the prospects of entry (a
Euroskeptic government). In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we also ¯nd that
the hold-up problem is not entirely eliminated, and the neutral government after
a delay eventually enters.
This model with delay as a domestic signal complements the established po-
litical economy of exchange rate where the adoption of a di®erent exchange rate
regime re°ects shares of interest groups in the economy. Here, we obtain a de-
lay even with a single representative ¯rm, irrespective of lobbying e®orts. Our
approach also enriches the literature on the allocation of the EU expenditures,
where voting weights seem to well correspond with the expenditure shares of the
old members (Kauppi and Widgren, 2004), but less indicate net gains of the new
members (Kauppi and Widgren, 2007): Our model suggests that an entry bonus
or fee should be included among determinants of the budget, which may capture
the unexplained di®erential. It also contributes to the classic tradeo® on the cost
and bene¯ts of policy surprises; here, a policy surprise in terms of an unexpected
club entry gives a strategic advantage to the government.
14Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Due to concavity of s(k) and convexity of l(k), we
have also concave S(k) and convex L(k). Examine the second order condition for
the payo® of the government, ¼G:
d2¼G
dk2 = ®Skk(k) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)Lkk(k) =
¿
1 ¡ ¿
[®skk(k) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)lkk(k)] < 0 (24)
This reveals that the extremum characterized by the respective ¯rst order con-
dition, ®Sk(k) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)Lk(k) = 0, or equivalently Sk(k)=Lk(k) = sk(k)=lk(k) =
(1 ¡ ®)=®, is unique, and it is maximum. To show that it is an interior solution
on k 2 [k;¹ k], notice that for k = k, lk = 0, and for k = ¹ k, sk = 0. As a result,
the range of function sk(k)=lk(k) on the domain k 2 [k;¹ k] is [0;+1]. To yield a
positive ¯nite value (1¡®)=®, the function must be evaluated at an interior point,
i.e. k < k¤ < ¹ k.
To derive the value explicitly, we use that for any expectations, the ¯rm's pro¯t
maximization reduces the expected marginal pro¯t of capital to zero, (1¡¿)[»¹ a+
(1 ¡ »)a]fk(K(»)) ¡ r = 0. Here we enter (1 ¡ ¿)¹ afk(K(»)) = sk(K(»)) + r and
(1¡¿)afk(K(»)) = ¡lk(K(»))+r to get »sk(K(»))¡(1¡»)lk(K(»)) = 0. Equiv-
alently, the ¯rm's pro¯t-maximization yields »Sk(K(»)) = (1 ¡ »)Lk(K(»)), or
equivalently Sk(K(»))=Lk(K(»)) = (1¡»)=». Denote the government-payo® max-
imizing expectations as »¤. Then, the equation rewrites into Sk(K(»))=Lk(K(»)) =
(1 ¡ »¤)=»¤, and combining with the government's payo®-maximization condition
above yields (1 ¡ ®)=® = (1 ¡ »¤)=»¤. Clearly, »¤ = ®. ¤
Proof of Lemma 1. No-entry in period 2 stems from subgame perfection and
the negative value of the bargaining prize in period 2, S(k2) + L(k2) + v < 0. To
establish e1 = 0, suppose that the autonomist government plays a mixed strategy.
The action of entry implies bargaining, but the bargaining prize is negative for
any pair (k1;k2): S(k1) + L(k1) + v + ±[S(k2) + L(k2) + v] < 0. Hence, the action
of entry brings the same disagreement point as no entry. The action of entry
however delivers another e®ect: the amount of capital in period 2 grows, because
entry weakens no-entry signal of the neutral type. Speci¯cally, by Bayes rule,
p2 =
p1(1 ¡ ¹ e1)
1 ¡ p1(1 ¡ e1) + p1(1 ¡ ¹ e1)
: (25)
Thus, dp2=de1 > 0. The ¯rm in period 2 sets best response by k2 = K(»2) =
K(p2), so dk2=de1 = K»(p2)dp2=de1 > 0. Since the autonomist government knows
that any overinvestment only brings a loss ¡L(k2), its objective is to minimize
the loss, hence needs as low k as possible, at best k = k. This means to decrease
probability of entry down to zero. ¤
15Proof of Lemma 2. If there is no e1 2 [0;1] such that the no-entry action
provides a larger payo®, then any mix e1 < 1 is strictly dominated by playing pure
entry, e1 = 1. Thus, for no-entry to be played, it must be ¼G
N(e1;k1) ¸ ¼G
E(e1;k1).
The validity of the condition can be evaluated at the maximum of ¼G
N(e1;k1) on
domain e1 2 [0;1]. That is, at e = E¤(p1) > 0 if p1 is large, and e = 0 > E¤(p1) if
p1 is low enough. This yields the speci¯c necessary conditions. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3. Part 1, k < ~ k: If condition in Lemma 2 is satis¯ed, we





















(1 ¡ e1p1)2±K»[®Sk(k2) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)Lk(k2)] < 0: (27)
By using the implicit function theorem and tediously rearranging, one gets
Ek1 = ¡Fe1=Fk1 > 0. Intuition is straightforward: Since more capital makes
entry relatively more bene¯cial, the rate of entry must not decrease. The implicit
solution in the term above satis¯es continuity as long as the condition in Lemma 2
holds. This is preserved up to k1 = ~ k, where the government turns to be indi®erent
between delay with e1 = maxf0;E¤(p1)g and full entry, e1 = 1. By continuity of
the best response, limk1!~ k¡ E(k1) = maxf0;E¤(p1)g.
Part 2, k 2 (~ k;~ k+²): Here, condition in Lemma 2 is violated. From monotonic-
ity of the payo® di®erential in (16), d(¼G
E ¡ ¼G
N)=dk1 > 0, we have 9² > 0 :
8k 2 (~ k;~ k + ²);8e1 2 [0;1];¼G
E(e1;~ k) > ¼G
N(e1;~ k). As a result, E(k1) = 1 and
Ek1(k1) = 0. To sum up, E(k1) is step-wise increasing at k1 = ~ k. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The best response of the ¯rm goes from k (for e1 = 0)
to K(p1) (for e1 = 1). The best response of the government is by Lemma 3
step-wise increasing around ~ k. If ~ k > K(p1), we avoid the possibility of multi-
ple equilibria caused by the discrete increase in the government's best response.
Speci¯cally, we avoid the equilibrium with e1 = 1 and k = K(p1). The condition
~ k > K(p1) is equivalent to ¼G
N(E¤(p1);K(p1)) > ¼G
E(E¤(p1);K(p1)). This is ex-
actly in Eq. (21). The existence is secured by the fact that E(k) 2 [0;E¤(p1)) and
E(K(p1)) < E¤(p1) < 1, i.e. there is an intersection of the best responses. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. The expected payo® of the government is e1¼G
E +(1¡
e1)¼G




N=@e1 = 0. By Lemma 2, we know that if e1 < 0 holds in equilibrium, then
¼G
E ¡ ¼G
N < 0. Hence, we need @¼G
N=@e1 > 0. From the u-shape of no-entry payo®
¼G
N, it implies p2 > ®, i.e. k2 > k¤, or equivalently e1 < E¤(p1). ¤
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